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Flipping a Coin: Evidence from University Applications
Abstract
We empirically investigate the possibility that a decision-maker prefers to avoid making a
decision and instead delegates it to an external device, e.g., a coin ﬂip. A large data set from the
centralized clearinghouse for university admissions in Germany shows a choice pattern of applicants
that is consistent with coin ﬂipping and that entails substantial consequences for the matching
outcome. In a series of experiments capturing the relevant features of university choice, participants
often choose lotteries between allocations rather than certain allocations. This contradicts most
theories of choice such as expected utility. A survey among university applicants links their choices
to the experiments and conﬁrms that the choice of random allocations is intentional.
Keywords: Preference for randomization, matching markets, individual decision making, university
admissions
JEL Classiﬁcation: D03; D01
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1 Introduction
In situations where decision-making is hard, a possible procedural preference arises: the decision
maker may wish for the decision to be taken away from her. Her cognitive or emotional cost of
deciding may outweigh the beneﬁts that arise from making the optimal choice. For example, the
decision maker may prefer not to make a choice without having suﬃcient time and energy to think it
through. Or, she may not feel entitled to make it. Or, she may anticipate a possible disappointment
about her choice that can arise after a subsequent resolution of uncertainty. Waiving some or all
of the decision right may thus seem desirable to her even though it typically increases the chance
of a suboptimal outcome.
The diﬃculty of such preferences is that they are non-consequentialist and therefore excluded
by most models of choice such as expected utility. In particular, ﬂipping a coin between dif-
ferent choice options contradicts expected utility theory except if the decision maker is exactly
indiﬀerent between these options. Yet many decision processes resemble coin ﬂips.3 More gen-
eral than expected utility theory, two closely related axioms of choicestochastic dominance and
betweennesspostulate that whenever the decision-maker has a strict preference for one of the
options, she makes the choice herself rather than delegate it to randomness.4
This paper presents evidence of intentional randomization regarding an important decision in
people's lives: university applications. When applying to the German clearinghouse for university
admission in medicine and related subjects, the quota rules require each applicant to submit mul-
tiple rank-order lists of universities. Each of the rank-order lists can be relevant for determining
the university seat. Our main empirical observation is that university applicants often contradict
themselves between the multiple rank-order lists that they submit. Thereby, they eﬀectively del-
egate the outcome to an uncertain process that is suboptimal under standard assumptions. If an
applicant had always reported the same rank-order list instead of producing a preference reversal
between her submitted lists, she would have increased the probability of ending up at a more
desirable university. Our cleanest (and most conservative) calculation, which excludes rational
reasons for choice reversals (see Section 3.3.2), ﬁnds that 14% of applicants exhibit such behavior.
Among these, we estimate that at least 20% are assigned to a university that they prefer less than
a university to which they would have been assigned in the absence of a preference reversal.
3Examples for deliberate randomizationwhich may also simply reﬂect risk-seeking expected-utility preferences
or other standard motivesinclude surprise menus at restaurants, last minute holiday booking desks at airports,
surprise-me features of internet services, and home delivery of boxes of produce with varying content. For a
historical account of randomization in the political arena see Buchstein (2009). Sunstein (2015) discusses questions
of paternalism under the assumption that decision makers have a preference for choice avoidance.
4Both axioms require that preference is preserved in probabilistic mixtures. In our context, their main diﬀerence
lies in the domain of preference; stochastic dominance relates to sure outcomes whereas betweenness relates to
lotteries. The stochastic dominance property is, in the version of Borah (2010): if a  b and c % d hold for
outcomes a, b, c, d, then a probabilistic mixture between the two preferred outcomes is preferred to a mixture of the
two less preferred outcomes, (λa, (1− λ)c)  (λb, (1− λ)d), where λ ∈ (0, 1] is the common probability of receiving
the ﬁrst object. Betweenness requires that if L  L′ holds for two lotteries L,L′, then the preference value of
(λL, (1− λ)L′) lies between that of the two lotteries.
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A possible alternative explanation of the preference reversals observed in university choice are
irrational beliefs of the decision-makers. The allocation mechanism of the central clearinghouse
is intricate and depends on the submitted preferences of thousands of applicants.5 Allowing for
the possibility of non-rational beliefs, a large set of choice patterns can be optimal. We therefore
conduct a set of simple classroom experiments that capture the relevant features of university
choice but leave little room for ambiguity or irrational beliefs.
The simple binary-choice format of Experiment I asks the decision-makers to choose between
the same two options twice, and a random draw determines which of the two choices is payoﬀ rele-
vant. Just as in the university application, the experimental design thereby allows the participants
to put one option ahead of another one in their ﬁrst choice and vice versa in their second choice.
In this experiment (Section 4.1), 28% of participants show such a preference reversal between their
two choices. Experiment II (Section 4.2) shows that the tendency to opt for randomization is
not induced by the repeated-choice format: if participants have an explicit option to randomize
between the alternative outcomes, they choose this option even more often, namely in 53% of cases
(Experiment II). Finally, Experiment III (Section 4.3) conﬁrms that reversals can also appear in
situations where people have to rank more than just two options, as in the context of university
admissions. Thus, we observe that in the classroom experiments, substantial proportions of par-
ticipants (between 15% and 53%) choose a random outcome and thereby violate standard theory.
The frequencies of such violations are consistent with the related lab experiments by Agranov and
Ortoleva (2017). In the literature review of Section 2 we discuss their experiments in detail, which
diﬀer from ours regarding the choice domain among other things.
Systematic patterns in our data lead us to reject the hypothesis that random utility shocks and
bounded rationality are the main drivers of behavior.6 In our experiments the pairs of identical
decisions are taken in immediate succession, without leaving time for a substantial impact of
utility swings. Moreover the agents are aware of the fact that they take the same decision multiple
times, which also reduces the scope of bounded rationality as an explanation of choice variations
(see Agranov and Ortoleva, 2017, for arguments along these lines). Finally, in the university
applications data and in the experiments, we observe speciﬁc patterns of reversals (mainly at the
ﬁrst rank and between adjacent ranks) that are unlikely to result from random utility or bounded
5The mechanism is analyzed in Braun et al. (2010), Braun et al. (2014) and Westkamp (2013), pointing to a
particular strategic feature of the mechanism that applicants fail to understand: the mechanism involves a sequence
of procedures, which aﬀects the truth-telling incentives at the early stages, because the applicants have to consider
the eﬀect of moving to the next procedure. In this paper we use these and other results from the literature on
matching algorithms to rule out the possibility that rational strategic considerations may induce preference reversals
that look like a preference for randomization. Pallais (2015) demonstrates another instance of questionable strategies
in university admission: a variation in the number of free American College Testing score reports to colleges has a
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the number of applications although the cost of an additional report is only $6.
6Agranov and Ortoleva (2017) provide a concise discussion of the families of these models. An important
literature analyzes whether previously found biases in decision experiments may be generated by models of random
utility shocks, see for example Berg et al. (2010) for a study on preference reversals or Blavatskyy (2006) on
betweenness violations.
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rationality. Instead, these patterns are consistent with deliberate choices.
The conclusion that the observed choice of randomized outcomes is deliberate is also sup-
ported by a survey that we ran among the university applicants. The survey responses express
unambiguously that most submissions of diﬀerent preference lists are conscious and intentional.
Possibly, some applicants hope to thereby increase their chances of getting a desirable seat, which
is reasonable only for a subset of applicants and otherwise hints at a false understanding of the
mechanism or the relevant probabilities. There is also direct evidence of a role of preferences for
randomization: we asked the respondents to make a hypothetical choice akin to our experiments
where randomization is possible and belief distortions are implausible by design. We observe that,
once again, a preference for randomization in this hypothetical choice appears frequently, and it is
positively correlated with the tendency to induce a random university allocation for oneself in the
actual application process.
Regarding the motives that lead people to take these choices, the psychological literature pro-
vides some relevant insights. The choice patterns are consistent with active decision avoidance
(e.g., Beattie et al., 1994, and Anderson, 2003). If a random device is available and if the process
of using the random device does not violate other principles, decision-makers have been shown
to use it in hypothetical scenarios (Keren and Teigen, 2010). More generally, the psychological
literature argues that decision-makers often prefer to avoid a decision even if this comes at the cost
of a (probabilistic) material consequence.7 In the context of university applications, the decision
between diﬀerent cities and programs of study can be hard. Thus, decision-avoiding behavior, by
way of submitting diﬀerent lists, seems plausible in the light of the psychological evidence.
Not making a decision may of course be optimal under a wider deﬁnition of (standard) eco-
nomic preferences. Especially informational reasons often justify the use of one of three avoidance
strategies: delay, default, or delegation. It may be important for the decision-maker to remain
ﬂexible if potential news can arrive in the future (delay). Or, there may exist an exogenous agent
or decision mechanism that uses better information, making it optimal to leave the choice to them
(default or delegation). Moreover, delegation can be an eﬀective device to avoid punishment for
unpopular decisions as shown by Bartling and Fischbacher (2012). But these reasons are unlikely
to apply in the case of university choice. The applicants know that their rank-order lists cannot be
changed after the arrival of new information, and the mechanism selecting the lists does not utilize
much choice-relevant information. Our survey among applicants also indicates that avoidance of
punishment by others is a minor issue for them.
The main contribution of the paper is to demonstrate that people choose to randomize delib-
erately in a real-world situation, namely applications to university. From a policy perspective, the
7As discussed for example by Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007), the tendency to employ randomization can be
viewed as stemming from a particular omission bias: decision-makers associate active decisions with more regret
than inactive choices such as a coin ﬂip. See also Kahneman and Miller (1986) and Gilovich and Medvec (1995) for
discussions of inaction and regret. A theoretical account of the phenomenon and its predictions is in a working-paper
version of this paper, Dwenger et al. (2014).
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question arises whether randomization via multiple rank-order lists should be eliminated. Market
design can be used to achieve this, e.g., by using a modiﬁed deferred-acceptance mechanism with
quotas that only asks for one rank-order list from each applicant, see Westkamp (2013) and Braun
et al. (2014). However, since the randomization is deliberate, one may argue that the applicants'
welfare is likely to be higher if they can randomize. Our own conclusions about welfare eﬀects of
randomization (Subsection 3.3.3) rely on a standard consequentialist approach where outcomes
determine welfare and randomization is thus viewed as a mistake. More research is needed to
obtain policy recommendations that are robust to non-consequentialist preferences models.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes the relevant litera-
ture in economics. Section 3 introduces the empirical context of university choice in Germany. To
identify the subset of data that is suitable for our purposes, the section discusses and applies the
relevant literature on matching mechanisms. Finally, it shows the calculations that yield our main
empirical result, and reports on a survey among students regarding the reasons for their choices.
Section 4 describes our series of experiments together with the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature review
The paper contributes to a recent literature on the relevance of non-standard behavior for market
design. There is evidence that preferences are not constant over time as observed for school choice
in New York City where re-applications are common even by those families who received their ﬁrst
choice, see Narita (2016). These ﬁndings are consistent with some families making random choices.
More generally, Benjamin et al. (2014) point to a lack of correspondence between submitted rank-
order lists to the National Residency Matching Program and statements of preferred jobs. Various
experiments from the lab and the ﬁeld document the diﬃculty of market participants to understand
the strategy proofness of matching mechanisms, see Chen and Sönmez (2006) and Guillen and
Hakimov (2018).
While the psychological literature has studied the phenomenon of choosing to randomize (see
the discussion above), the economics literature pays considerably less attention to the possibility
of intentional use of random devices. Diecidue et al. (2004) argue that this is due to precisely the
property of stochastic dominance violations: a theory that comes with a feature that is normatively
so unappealing as stochastic dominance violations is easily dismissed. Diecidue et al. provide a
diﬀerent interpretation of coin ﬂippingutility of gamblingand prove that stochastic dominance
violations are a core feature of such preferences. Possible motivations for gambling that are covered
in the economics literature include anticipatory feelings during the state of uncertainty, such as
utility from wishful thinking (see e.g., Caplin and Leahy, 2001, Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005, or
Koszegi and Rabin, 2009). These motivations could in principle contribute to the attractiveness
of randomization also in our choice settings, but we regard this as implausible at least in our
classroom experiments because the state of uncertainty is resolved almost immediately.
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Another possible driver for a preference for randomization is a possible procedural concern
that arises in the context of fairness, especially when multiple people are involved. People have
preferences over diﬀerent allocation mechanisms even if they themselves do not participate in the
mechanism (Kahneman et al., 1986). Experimental results conﬁrm that people may prefer ex ante
fair lotteries if an ex post fair outcome is unavailable (see Bolton et al., 2005 and Krawczyk and
Le Lec, 2010).8 Such fairness concerns cannot explain random choices in our experiments, due to
their single-agent setups, and only implausibly so in the university context.
Several theories can account for random choicesthey may be subsumed under models with
boundedly rational decision makers, random-utility models, and models of deliberate randomiza-
tion, see Agranov and Ortoleva (2017) for an overview. Bounded rationality encompasses models
where decision makers have a well-deﬁned utility function but err with a certain probability when
making their choice (see Ratcliﬀ, 1978, and many others). In random-utility models (e.g. Gul and
Pesendorfer, 2006), the players maximize a well-deﬁned utility function but this utility function
changes over time in a random manner. In both sets of models, there is no deliberate decision
to randomize. Finally, the theoretical literature on deliberate randomizationsee e.g. Machina
(1985), Fudenberg et al. (2015) or Cerreira-Vioglio et al. (2016)provides structural reasons (like
the desire to minimize regret) and axiomatizations of preferences that allow for deliberate coin
ﬂips.
The contribution by Agranov and Ortoleva (2017) reports on context-free experiments that were
conducted independently from ours, demonstrating that participants who face the same binary-
lottery choice task several times often switch between their choices if one lottery is not clearly
better than the other. This is similar to the observation made by Hey and Orme (1994), among
others, that a non-trivial proportion of decision makers show inconsistent behavior in repeated-
choice settings.9 Agranov and Ortoleva (2017) provide evidence that strongly suggests a deliberate
decision process by showing that a signiﬁcant fraction of participants is willing to pay for a coin
ﬂip between the two lotteries.
Our study complements Agranov and Ortoleva's work in several ways. The signiﬁcant concep-
tual contrast between our paper and Agranov and Ortoleva's is the diﬀerence in choice domains
(ambiguity versus risk). The choice objects that Agranov and Ortoleva focus on lie in the domain
of risk and for their modelling of deliberate randomization, they use Cerreira-Vioglio et al.'s (2016)
Cautious Stochastic Choice deﬁned for lotteries. Our choice objects, in contrast, do not come with
exogenous probabilities: a voucher's consumption value is uncertain due to the unknown transac-
tion cost and the unknown availability of goods; a university seat is uncertain in many dimensions
8To account for such evidence, Borah (2010) develops a model where a decision-maker's utility is a weighted
sum of her expected utility from the lottery outcome as well as a procedural component. Sen (1997) proposes
accommodating concerns for the procedure in models of menu-dependent preferences.
9Other related studies show that experimental participants sometimes value a lottery less than its worst possible
realization (Gneezy et al. 2006, Sonsino 2008, Andreoni and Sprenger 2011). This ﬁnding has been ascribed to a
distaste for uncertainty (Simonsohn 2009).
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of the applicant's life. Such extensions of the choice domain are important to investigate, since it
is evident that many contexts of uncertainty are inherently ambiguous. One may regard as our
main contribution the demonstration that the identiﬁed preference for randomization has real-
world implications, namely in university admissions. Conceptually, it is a natural extension, not
least because of the similarity of models: the intuition behind several theories of stochastic choice,
including Cautious Stochastic Choice, involves a pessimistic attitude towards uncertainty that is
similar to the formalizations of pessimism in the theories of choice under ambiguity.
Additional pre-existing experiments have also discussed false diversiﬁcation motives (see Chen
and Corter, 2006, and Rubinstein, 2002) where participants choose mixtures in ways that violate
expected utility. Simonson (1990) explains variety-seeking by consumers as a conscious cogni-
tive mechanism to avoid having to make diﬃcult trade-oﬀs. Complementing these studies, our
participants face experiments that are cognitively very straightforward.10
The subsequent sections will refer to additional literature that is relevant in the context of
the respective empirical contexts: on matching algorithms in Section 3 and on menu and framing
eﬀects in Section 4.
3 Field evidence: Reversals in university applications
Admissions to German undergraduate university programs in the medical subjects are centrally
administered by a clearinghouse. The clearinghouse assigns applicants according to the following
three procedures that are implemented in a sequential order:
(1) Procedure A admits students who are top of the class to up to 20% of seats.
(2) Procedure W admits students with long waiting times to up to 20% of seats.
(3) Procedure U represents admission by universities according to their own criteria to the
remaining (at least 60% of) seats.
For each of the three procedures, applicants are asked to submit a preference ranking of no
more than six universities, and these lists can either be identical or diﬀerent across procedures.
All rank-order lists are submitted at the same moment in time. The central clearinghouse employs
the three procedures in a strictly sequential order: all applicants who are matched in procedure A
are ﬁrmly assigned a seat at their matched university and do not take part in procedures W and
U. All remaining applicants enter procedure W and may be matched there. After procedure W,
all applicants who are still unmatched enter procedure U. The fact that applicants simultaneously
submit three potentially diﬀerent rank-order lists of universities, each of which may be relevant, is
a unique property of the German mechanism and makes it suitable for our analysis.
10As in the experiments in Rubinstein (2002), our participants can get at most one reward and cannot hedge,
removing the possibility of a diversiﬁcation value. Rubinstein ﬁnds an irrational mixture of choices and ascribes the
eﬀect to a cognitive failure of grasping the multi-stage randomness in his experiment (that is, participants wrongly
apply the intuition of diversiﬁcation).
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Applicants who are successful in procedure W are a disjoint group with relatively poor grades
and low chances of being admitted through the other two procedures. We therefore restrict our
attention to procedures A and U, where admission largely follows the grade point average (GPA)
in ﬁnal secondary school examinations. In the following section (3.1), we brieﬂy introduce the two
procedures and the relevant matching literature.
Based on the data described in section 3.2, section 3.3 assesses the frequency of preference
reversals, i.e., the submission of diﬀerent preference lists by the same applicants. As we will explain
in detail, not all instances of self-contradicting applications violate standard theory, due to strategic
reasons. We therefore need to identify a subset of cases where these strategic reasons do not apply.
Our empirical strategy is as follows. We ﬁrst establish that under standard, consequentialist
preferences, applicants have no incentive to distort their rank-order list for procedure U. That
is, the ranking in procedure U contains an applicant's true preference under the hypothesis
that a preference for randomization is absent. (In fact, the information brochure of the clearing
house indicates to applicants that it is in their interest to reveal their preferences truthfully under
procedure U. We conﬁrm this below by providing theoretical arguments.) We then establish that we
can identify a subset of applicants who have incentives to also report the same rank-order list under
procedure A: these are applicants for whom a preference reversal may not only have a material
consequence but who also have no strategic incentives to game the application system. Within
this subgroup of applicants, we can thus detect applicants with a preference for randomization as
those who nevertheless reverse their two rank-order lists between procedures A and U.
A reversal by these individuals increases their probability of ending up at a suboptimal uni-
versity. Notice that by construction of our argument, this is a violation of the assumption of
standard, consequentialist preferences, which is needed to establish the preference list submitted
for procedure U as the true preference ordering. We therefore cannot necessarily assume that the
rank-order lists of procedure U reﬂect the true preferences of these applicants, which makes it hard
to arrive at a welfare evaluation. But calculations in section 3.3.3 show that no matter what is the
true preference order, the consequences of the preference reversals are economically signiﬁcant.
3.1 Matching procedures
3.1.1 Procedure U
For expositional reasons, we start by introducing procedure U even though it is administered at
the end of the admission process. Procedure U corresponds to a two-sided market where not
only applicants but also universities express their preferences over their possible matches. Each
university ranks the applicants who list it on their preference list, using the ﬁnal grade from school
as the predominant but not necessarily the only criterion to discriminate between applicants.
Given the preference lists of universities and applicants, the central clearinghouse applies the
college-proposing Gale-Shapley algorithm. The algorithm was ﬁrst described by Gale and Shapley
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(1962) although similar ideas had been in use since the 1950s in the U.S. clearinghouse for the ﬁrst
jobs of doctors (see Roth, 2008). A description of the college-proposing Gale-Shapley mechanism
is in the appendix.
As indicated above, the information brochure of the clearinghouse explicitly advises applicants
to reveal their true preferences in procedure U. This advice is justiﬁable by two theoretical argu-
ments. First, in the college-proposing Gale-Shapley mechanism all successful manipulations can
also be accomplished by truncations, see Roth and Peranson (1999), p.762, referring to results
by Roth and Vande Vate (1991). Such truncations require the least information about others'
preferences among all possible manipulations that are potentially beneﬁcial to the decision maker
(Roth and Rothblum, 1999). Thus, even if applicants strategically truncate their lists submitted
in procedure U,11 the correct rank order of the remaining choices is preserved. Second, if pref-
erences of universities are perfectly correlated, then there is only one stable matching.12 In this
case, the stable matching is achieved by both the college- and the student-proposing Gale-Shapley
mechanism. Since the latter is strategy-proof (Roth, 1982), it follows that truth-telling is also a
dominant strategy in the college-proposing Gale-Shapley mechanism.13
We thus conclude that the incentives to misrepresent one's preferences in procedure U are
null for perfectly correlated preferences of universities and they are small if the preferences of
universities are strongly correlated. This is the case in the German university admission system
where all universities have to use the GPA as the main criterion due to legal constraints: 63%
of universities base their ranking of applicants solely on the ﬁnal grade. The other universities
also mainly base their decisions on GPA but use completed apprenticeship in the area of interest
(53%), grades from major subjects in school such as grades in maths (38%), and interviews (27%)
as additional admission criteria (multiple criteria possible).14 These additional criteria are unlikely
to play a major role for the ranking of universities: Less than 4% of applicants in our data set have
completed an apprenticeship, while interviews and especially grades from major subjects are likely
to show a strong correlation with GPA. Thus, rankings by universities are highly correlated with
grade. Even if small incentives to misrepresent preferences exist, truncations of the true preference
list are optimal and far more plausible than other manipulations (especially given the advice of the
11In the information brochure, the central clearinghouse does not mention the possibility of such truncations or
other forms of strategically misrepresenting one's true preferences in procedure U (except for a pre-selection stage
which does not aﬀect our analysis).
12In a stable matching everybody prefers their match over no match at all and there is no applicant and university
who are not matched but who would both prefer to be. To see why there is only one stable matching if university
preferences are perfectly correlated, note that in any stable matching the applicant ranked highest by the universities
gets his preferred matching partner. Thus, there is only one stable matching partner for the applicant with the best
ﬁnal grade. This argument can be repeated for all other applicants.
13The fact that only up to six universities can be ranked might induce applicants to misrepresent their preferences
by including safe options (Haeringer and Klijn 2009). However, we restrict attention to top students who do not
face the risk of being unassigned to a seat at one of their six choices in procedure U.
14Universities with additional admission criteria administer procedure U themselves. Our data set does not
include information on subject grades, interview outcomes and details on completed apprenticeships. This prevents
us from providing an empirically estimated correlation coeﬃcient of university preferences.
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clearinghouse). We will therefore consider the non-empty parts of the rank-order lists submitted
under procedure U as reﬂecting the true preferences of applicants.
3.1.2 Procedure A
Procedure A is employed to reward excellent GPAs in secondary schools. The top 20% of applicants
are assigned to seats, based on the preference list that they submit for procedure A and using the
so-called Boston mechanism, which admits as many applicants as possible to their ﬁrst choice (k th
choice) and considers second choices ((k+1)th choices) only if there are still seats left at the end of
the ﬁrst (k th) round (cf. the appendix and Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) for details on the
Boston mechanism).
The Boston mechanism implies that an applicant ranking a university in k th position is admitted
before applicants ranking a university in (k+1)th position are consideredindependently of her
high-school GPA. Hence, it may be advantageous for some applicants to manipulate their true
preference ordering by skipping a university if they do not have any chance of getting a seat. We
need to take this incentive into account when looking for deliberate reversals in the preference lists.
In addition to the strategic incentives due to the Boston mechanism itself, the sequential
nature of the admission process creates incentives to truncate one's preference list in procedure A.
Procedure A is the ﬁrst to be administered and any assignment in this procedure is ﬁnal, so only
applicants who were not admitted in procedure A (nor in procedure W) participate in procedure U.
Both procedures A and U largely follow average grades, that is, applicants with a very good GPA
have a chance of being admitted in both procedures. Top applicants should therefore avoid being
matched to a less preferred university in procedure A if the alternative is to wait for procedure
U and be admitted to a more preferred university there. This may induce applicants to submit
rank-order lists in procedure A that are shorter than their true preference order.15
In our analysis below, we eliminate all cases where preference reversals can be driven by the
strategic motives described above. The hypothesized preference for randomization can still apply,
as the applicants can seek randomness by submitting diﬀerent lists in procedures A and U.
3.2 Description of the data
We use the (anonymized) information collected by the central clearinghouse covering seven waves
of applications between the winter term 2005/06 and the winter term 2008/09. During our obser-
vation period the following six subjects were centrally administered and are part of our data set:
biology, medicine, pharmacy, psychology, animal health, and dentistry.16 The data set contains
15Braun et al. (2010) investigate such truncations and demonstrate that many applicants submit too long lists
for procedure A. The objective of procedure Ato give an additional advantage to the applicants with highest
GPAtherefore fails to be met.
16In Germany, students typically choose one subject for their studies at the university, and admission criteria and
procedures diﬀer between subjects.
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all applications for these subjects and records all information provided by the applicants including
data on individual characteristics such as ﬁnal GPA, age, sex, and location. Most important for
our purpose, the database provides information on the admission procedures that a prospective
student has participated in as well as the rank-order lists he or she has submitted.
To avoid multiple counting, we only consider each individual's ﬁrst application in the data
set. After excluding individuals not applying for procedure U and discarding individuals whose
preference list for procedure U might be incomplete due to pre-selection,17 we are left with a total
of 224,016 ﬁrst-time applications.
3.3 Results: Preference reversals in university applications
3.3.1 Full data set
We ﬁrst examine the full set of ﬁrst-time applicants to study whether preference lists coincide in
procedures A and U. Table 1 shows where the entries on the lists submitted for procedure U appear
on the lists for procedure A. Row i, i=1,...,6, of the table contains, for the universities on rank i
for procedure U, the percentage of cases in which the same applicant listed the university on rank
j of the list for procedure A.
Table 1: Conditional proportions, showing where universities ranked in procedure U appear in
rank-order lists for procedure A (all entries in %)
U \A 1 2 3 4 5 6 not ranked
1 75.43 4.05 1.91 1.14 0.78 0.54 16.15
2 5.34 63.40 4.83 2.37 1.64 1.10 21.33
3 2.71 5.23 58.80 4.76 2.84 1.78 23.89
4 2.35 3.45 5.77 55.88 4.94 2.64 24.96
5 1.74 2.36 3.42 5.88 55.23 4.59 26.80
6 1.66 1.89 2.36 3.52 5.45 54.92 30.20
Notes: Full data set as described in Section 3.2 (N=224,016 observations).
Source: Own calculations based on ZVS data on applicants, waves 2005/06 to 2008/09.
The diagonal elements in the table indicate identical entries. For example, in 75% of applica-
tions the top-ranked university from procedure U is also ranked ﬁrst in procedure A. Similarly,
63% of universities ranked second in procedure U are ranked second in procedure A, etc. The
oﬀ-diagonal elements report the discrepancies between the lists that applicants submit in the two
procedures. Diﬀerences at a certain preference rank can result either from listing diﬀerent univer-
sities or from listing the same universities in a diﬀerent ordering. Altogether, the proportions in
Table 1 show that a considerable number of applicants submit diﬀerent lists.
17All procedures are two-stage procedures. At the ﬁrst stage applicants are pre-selected (in the language used
by the clearing house) and at the second stage the pre-selected applicants compete for admission. The pre-selection
criteria applied by the universities diﬀer, requiring for example that the university be listed as a ﬁrst preference, or
as a ﬁrst to third preference. Some universities use a combination of average ﬁnal grade and preference rank. But
after pre-selection, the applicants are allowed to reshue the ordering of their rank-list. We only consider the ﬁnal
rank-order list for procedure U, since this list should be free from such strategic manipulations.
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Notice that skipping the top-ranked university in procedure A moves up all universities named
on rank 2 and below. In Table 1, skipping the top-ranked university is therefore recorded in
multiple preference reversals that appear further down the list. To avoid such double counting,
Table 2 repeats the counting exercise of Table 1 but only includes the ﬁrst preference reversal
within an application. Entries in rows 2...6 of Table 2 (marked with an asterisk) reﬂect additional
cases of preference reversals, relative to previous ranks. For example, not ranking the top U-ranked
university in procedure A only appears in the table's ﬁrst row as not ranked while the eﬀects of
this reversal further down the list are not counted. Table 2 therefore counts each application with
a preference reversal exactly once. It conﬁrms that preference reversals are widespread: a total of
64% of all applicants reverse at least one preference rank between procedures U and A or do not list
a university in procedure A that is listed in procedure U. Disregarding reversals from not ranking
universities in procedure A but listing them in procedure U (36%) shows that approximately 29%
of applicants change the ordering of their preference lists.
Table 2: Preference reversals (all entries in %)
U \A 2 3 4 5 6 not ranked total
1 4.05 1.91 1.14 0.78 0.54 16.15 24.57
2* - 4.58 1.92 1.16 0.78 7.67 16.11
3* - - 3.55 1.58 0.86 3.89 9.88
4* - - - 2.87 1.12 3.02 7.01
5* - - - - 1.80 2.21 4.01
6* - - - - - 2.86 2.86
total 4.05 6.49 6.61 6.39 5.09 35.81 64.44
Notes: See Table 1.
RESULT 1: Overall, 64% of university applicants submit diﬀerent rank-order lists in procedures
A and U. 29% of applicants reverse the order of at least two universities.
3.3.2 Conservative estimate: Ruling out strategic manipulations and irrelevance
As noted in Section 3.1.2, applicants may have incentives to strategically manipulate their pref-
erence lists for procedure A by skipping a university if they do not expect to have a chance of
being admitted at that university. They may also truncate their rank-order list for procedure A in
order to avoid being matched to a lower preference in procedure A and instead wait for procedure
U. Besides these strategic considerations, applicants might not follow their true preferences when
ﬁlling out lists in procedures that are most likely to be irrelevant for them. This may result in
preference reversals that are solely due to the fact that individuals do not care: e.g., an applicant
who can be sure of being matched in procedure A (because her GPA is clearly good enough for
her top choice on list A) might as well report a reversed list for procedure U.
In order to identify strategic incentives and the relevance of lists, applicants need to antici-
pate their chances of success for procedure A and assess the probability with which each of the
procedures applies to them. The clearinghouse publishes detailed information on the application
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characteristics of admitted candidates for every university-ﬁeld combination in each year. It also
advises applicants to use the historical admissions statistics when devising their list for procedure
A, and it points out the potential advantage of manipulating the list. Under the auxiliary assump-
tion that admission chances are stable from year to year (which is close to correct), the applicants
have the information necessary for strategic manipulations. Individuals also know from historical
admissions data which procedures are likely to be relevant to them.
To exclude all observations where strategic considerations of the applicants can be at work,
we ﬁrst select only those applicants who, on the considered rank, would have been admitted in
procedure A to the university listed in procedure U, in the preceding year. All others have a good
reason to name a diﬀerent university on this rank for procedure A. Second, we restrict attention
to ranks where a university is listed in both procedures to exclude strategic truncations. This
restricts the analysis to 91,485 ﬁrst-time applications. To rule out irrelevance of procedure U,
we additionally drop individuals from the data set whose GPA is at least 0.4 grade points better
than the threshold needed for admission on the considered rank of list A. Further, we focus on
applicants who belong to the (top 20%) group that is selected for procedure A to make sure that
the preference list for A is relevant, too. This leaves us with 8,508 applicants, who are neither
prone to strategic behavior nor to carelessness when deciding about their preference lists. Note
also that this group of students contains many of the smartest students ﬁnishing high school in
this year. This decreases the likelihood that their choices are due to confusion about the process.
Considering these applicants, we ﬁnd that the percentage of individuals stating congruent
preferences in both procedures increases relative to the previous count that included all applicants.
94% of applicants top-rank the same university in procedures U and A (Table 3); the remaining
6% either do not rank their top university from procedure U at all or include it on a lower rank in
procedure A.
Table 3: Conditional proportions, ruling out strategic incentives and irrelevance (all entries in %)
U \A 1 2 3 4 5 6 not ranked
1 93.67 3.39 0.89 0.38 0.27 0.15 1.26
2 1.90 74.76 3.83 1.29 0.65 0.33 17.23
3 0.82 3.35 66.14 3.42 2.05 0.90 23.27
4 0.64 1.93 3.80 61.52 3.62 1.50 26.99
5 0.23 0.46 1.67 3.96 61.13 3.08 29.48
6 0.30 0.30 0.80 1.89 2.98 59.32 34.41
Notes: We only consider applications where both preference rankings contain a nonempty cell in the considered
rank, and where the applicant's entry in procedure U would have been successful in the previous year, conditional
on previous ranks being unsuccessful. In addition, we discard applicants who do not belong to the top 20%
group selected for procedure A or individuals whose GPA is at least 0.4 grade points better than the threshold
needed for admission on the considered rank of list A, or for any university listed on a previous rank. N=8,508
observations.
Source: Own calculations based on ZVS data on applicants, waves 2005/06 to 2008/09.
In order to determine the number of individuals reversing at least one preference, we again
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exclude double-counting and focus on the ﬁrst preference reversal within each application. The
resulting Table 4 shows that 14% of all individuals in our data set submit preference lists for
procedures A and U that diﬀer in at least one rank.
Table 4: Preference reversals, ruling out strategic incentives and irrelevance (all entries in %)
U \A 2 3 4 5 6 not ranked total
1 3.39 0.89 0.38 0.27 0.15 1.26 6.34
2* - 2.09 0.65 0.32 0.18 0.87 4.10
3* - - 0.84 0.46 0.12 0.48 1.89
4* - - - 0.49 0.15 0.33 0.98
5* - - - - 0.28 0.31 0.59
6* - - - - - 0.24 0.24
total 3.39 2.99 1.86 1.54 0.88 3.48 14.13
Notes: See Table 3.
RESULT 2: In a conservative estimate, we ﬁnd that 14% of applicants submit preference lists
that diﬀer in at least one rank across procedures. These choices are consistent with a preference
for randomization and cannot be rationalized by strategic motives or by irrelevance of one of the
lists for the applicants.
3.3.3 Consequences arising from preference reversals
We now report on the frequencies with which applicants who reverse their preferences between
lists are matched unnecessarily to suboptimal universities. For this exercise, we again restrict
attention to applicants who neither face strategic incentives nor have reasons to ignore one of the
preference lists due to irrelevance. For these applicants we ask whether those who show preference
reversals would be matched to a better university if they reported the same rank-order list for both
procedures.
Since these applicants reverse their preference orders between the two procedures, it is not
obvious by which preference order one should evaluate their outcome. We thus consider both
reported preference lists as candidates for the true preference order. First, we consider the case
that applicants report their true preferences under procedure U, as is optimal according to the
above discussion. For the ﬁrst three of the seven waves of applications, we have the necessary data
available to answer the question.18 Of the N=5,170 applications that appear in these three waves,
757 (15%) show preference reversals between the two lists, which is comparable to our previous
results that use all data. Column (1) of Table 5 shows the preference rank on the list for U that
was realized for these applicants, and column (2) shows the rank that they could have obtained if
they had reported their ranking for U also under procedure A.
The comparison of columns (1) and (2) shows that preference reversals substantially harm the
individuals who commit them. While only 66.1% of applicants in this group actually obtain their
18For the remaining waves, the matching outcome is not available in our data set.
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Table 5: Matching outcomes (all entries in %)
Individuals showing pref. reversals Individuals without pref. reversals
Rank realized Rank possible Rank realized
Rank (1) (2) (3)
1 66.1 86.9 88.9
2 17.0 4.1 5.7
3 7.9 3.0 1.6
4 3.0 1.8 1.1
5 1.7 0.9 0.9
6 2.4 1.1 0.4
Other 1.8 2.1 1.4
Sum 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=757 N=4,413
Notes: Matching outcomes of N=5,170 applicants in three waves. All entries in percent. (1) contains actual
matches of applicants who submitted lists containing preference reversals between A and U. (2) contains hy-
pothetical matches under the counterfactual assumption that the same set of applicants submit the list for U
under both procedures. We consider individual changes of lists, that is, based on the scenario that the behavior
of the other applicants is unchanged. (3) contains the actual matches of all applicants who submitted consistent
lists.
Source: Own calculations based on ZVS data on applicants, waves 2005/06 to 2006/07.
most preferred university seat, 86.9% could have obtained their ﬁrst choice under the counterfactual
that they simply report their list for U also in A. The diﬀerence is 20.8 percentage points or a
total of 158 applicants in this restricted sample.19 Column (3) shows that the remaining set of
4,413 applicants who submit consistent lists in A and U have success rates that are very close to
the counterfactual results of column (2). This indicates that the two sets of applicants on average
face decision problems of comparable importance.
Separate calculations show that the ineﬃciency becomes even stronger if we further restrict
the sample to the 190 applicants (again ruling out strategic incentives and irrelevance in the three
relevant waves) who simply ﬂip their top two choices between the lists A and U. Of them, only
53.7% actually obtained their top choice according to the list in U, whereas 82.1% could have
obtained it under the counterfactual strategy of submitting the list for U to both procedures.
We now consider the case that the rank-order list submitted under procedure A reﬂects the
true preference order. Under this assumption, distorting one's preference list under procedure
U is even more harmful in our sample: all applicants who are eligible for procedure A have a
very high chance to be matched to their top A-ranked university under procedure U. A further
data restriction is, however, that the central clearinghouse itself implements procedure U only
for a subset of universities and we thus only have outcome data for procedure U on this subset
of universities. We can therefore construct the required counterfactual outcomes for only 3,162
individuals, whereof 414 applicants (13%) display preference reversals. For these individuals, the
possible rate of being matched to their top A-ranked university under procedure U is 95.7%. The
19The ineﬃciencies are even stronger if we consider an alternative counterfactual strategy where the applicants
use their preference list for procedure U but truncate it optimally. Instead of 86.9% as reported in column (2) of
Table 5, a total of 93.1% of the same 757 applicants could have obtained their top choice.
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applicants' actual success rate of being matched to their top A-ranked university is only 65.9%.
The diﬀerence in actual versus possible outcome is therefore even larger than in Table 5. We note
that the employed subsample of universities may create a selection problem for this calculation.
We also note that, importantly, it is more plausible that applicants report their true preference
under procedure U than under procedure A because the clearinghouse advises them to do so.
RESULT 3: Preference reversals have allocative consequences. Considering only applicants for
whom both lists are relevant and who have no strategic incentives to submit lists with preference
reversals, more than 20% could have been allocated to their top-ranked university seat but received
a diﬀerent seat as a consequence of their reversal.
3.3.4 Survey of applicants
What are the motives for applicants to submit diﬀerent lists? To answer this question, we con-
ducted a survey among all applicants of the year 2015 for medicine and related subjects at German
universities.20 They were invited to participate through the website of the clearinghouse. Overall,
1,824 persons completed the survey. A large majority report that they were aware of the fact that
diﬀerent preference lists can be submitted (83%), and a majority of them did so (68%).21 Among
those who submitted diﬀerent lists, 81% report that this was a conscious decision. This conﬁrms
our presumption that the submission of diﬀerent lists is purposeful.
Regarding the reasons for submitting diﬀerent lists, the survey questionnaire gives the respon-
dents eight possible answers, asking to select up to three of them as applicable. Large proportions
of respondents indicate that they regarded one of the lists as irrelevant (35%) or that they submit-
ted diﬀerent lists out of strategic considerations, in order to increase the likelihood of getting a seat
(79%) or to increase the likelihood of getting the best possible seat (26%). Smaller proportions
of respondents indicate that they were indiﬀerent (24%), that they had diﬃculties in deciding
(12%), that they attempted to give a fair chance to conﬂicting goals between themselves and
their family and friends (5%) or that they feared to regret their decision in the future (4%). 4.4%
answered Other as one of the main three reasons. Taking together the answers regarding diﬃcul-
ties in deciding, procedural fairness concerns, and fear of regret suggests that 21% of the surveyed
applicants may exhibit preferences that are non-consequentialist.
The survey then asks the applicants to give one main reason for having submitted diﬀerent lists.
We ﬁnd that 12% of applicants neither indicate irrelevance nor one of the two strategic motives
as their main reason. Among these 12% of applicants, the percentages of students who mention
indiﬀerence, diﬃculties to decide, considering goals of family/friends, fear of regret, or Other, are
46%, 23%, 9%, 6%, and 15%, respectively.
20The translated questions of the survey are in the appendix.
21All data are self reported, since we did not get permission to match the survey responses to the individual
applications.
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The participants in the survey also face a hypothetical decision problem. They are asked to con-
sider two universities: their most preferred university, labeled university A, and the second-most
preferred university, university B. Participants choose between four options: (i) being admitted
to A with certainty, (ii) being admitted to A with a probability 0.6 and B with 0.4, (iii) being
admitted to B with certainty, and (iv) being admitted to A with a probability of 0.4 and to B with
0.6. This choice problem is very close to one of our experiments, described in the next section. Of
all respondents, 35% choose one of the two lotteries over A and B, violating stochastic dominance.
Such a choice for randomization is signiﬁcantly more common among those who report having
submitted diﬀerent lists in the real application procedure although the diﬀerence is small (36%
versus 32%, p=0.047, one-sided). When asked whether they prefer to leave certain decisions to
chance, a slightly higher proportion conﬁrms this preference among those who submitted diﬀerent
lists than among others (10.3% versus 7.5%, p=0.03, one-sided).
We interpret the survey results as evidence that the vast majority of applicants submit diﬀerent
lists on purpose and that submission of diﬀerent lists in the application procedure is correlated with
the respondents' preference for randomization. Moreover, the results indicate that indiﬀerence and
diﬃculties to decide are more important correlates of a random choice than fear of regret or the
desire to acknowledge the wishes of relatives and friends through the use of diﬀerent lists.
4 Experiments
This section presents our three experimental designs and results. The design of Experiment III is
closest to the university application context of the previous section, whereas Experiments I and II
are stripped-down versions of Experiment III but can also stand alone as tests for a possible eﬀect
of a preference for randomization. We employed classroom experiments that were conducted in
introductory undergraduate lectures in microeconomics and macroeconomics at Technical Univer-
sity Berlin and Free University Berlin.22 Each of the experiments lasted for 5-10 minutes and was
conducted with paper and pencil. Only some of the participants were paid. This procedure saved
time and money compared to laboratory experiments, thus allowing for large sample sizes. All ex-
periments were incentivized with vouchers from Amazon and/or Starbucks, which the participants
received depending on their choices.23 A translation of the instructions of all three experiments is
22Parallel to the classroom version of Experiment III, we also conducted a similar newspaper experiment in
combination with an online survey. This experiment was advertised in the WZB-Mitteilungen, a quarterly journal
of the social science research institute WZB. The WZB-Mitteilungen is read by researchers, policy makers, and the
interested public. This experiment diﬀers from the classroom experiments in a number of respect. It qualitatively
conﬁrms the results, albeit with smaller eﬀect sizes in most cases. Details on the procedure and results are in the
appendix.
23The choice of vouchers as prizes has several motivations. (i) The description and delivery of vouchers are
straightforward both in the classroom experiments and in the newspaper experiment. (ii) Monetary values of
vouchers are ﬂexible. (iii) Since the values of vouchers are not directly comparable across shops, the decision
problem is non-trivial.
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in the appendix. Note that we re-labeled the options A to D in the instructions to a1 to a4 in the
paper. For each of the three experiments, we called a1 the option that is preferred most frequently.
4.1 Experiment I: Deliberate choice reversals
4.1.1 Design
In Treatment 1 of Experiment I, 69 participants face a choice between two prizes. Prize a1 is a
combined package of a 14 Euro Starbucks voucher together with a 10 Euro Amazon voucher. The
other prize, a2, is a 19 Euro Starbucks voucher. Participants have to choose twice between the two
prizes, but only one choice task is relevant ex post: participants receive the prize that they report
in the ﬁrst choice task with probability 0.6 and the prize that they report in the second choice
task with probability 0.4. With a suﬃciently strong preference for randomization, they would
induce a random outcome by reporting two diﬀerent prizes in the two choice tasks. A participant
with standard, consequentialist preferences would choose the same prize in both tasks unless she
is indiﬀerent between the two prizes.
In a control treatment, Treatment 2, we let a separate set of 68 participants choose only once
between the two prizes a1 and a2. For comparison with the second choice task in Treatment 1,
the payout rule is that participants receive their chosen prize with probability 0.4. Treatment 2
generates a comparison data set, allowing us to observe the participant population's preference
between the two prizes. Under standard preferences, the same choice frequencies would arise on
average for the second choice task in Treatment 1 and the choice task in Treatment 2. Note that
in both decisions, the participant receives the chosen prize with a probability of 0.4. For example,
a random utility model with a distribution of utility shocks that is constant across choices would
generate the same choice probabilities across tasks.
Both treatments are run in parallel in the same classroom, by randomly distributing diﬀerent
sets of instructions to diﬀerent students. We paid out a prize to every tenth participating student:
at the end of the experiment, we randomly determined the participants who would receive a prize
and played out the random draws for the two treatments.24
4.1.2 Results
In Treatment 2, the control treatment, 81% of participants choose a1. More importantly, we ﬁnd in
Treatment 1 that a signiﬁcant proportion of participants reverse their choices: 28% of participants
either choose a1 in the ﬁrst task and a2 in the second task or the reverse. Figure 1 shows the
diﬀerent choice combinations made by the participants in Treatment 1. While choice reversals
can be trivially explained by indiﬀerence, we observe that the pattern of reversals is systematic:
24It may be that the random payment procedure diminishes the eﬀect of a preference for randomization. This
would make it less likely that the violations of standard preferences appear.
17
First, the choice of a1 in the second choice task of Treatment 1 is signiﬁcantly less frequent than
in Treatment 2, 0.64 < 0.81 (p = 0.02, Fisher's exact test). Second, in Treatment 1 the share of
participants choosing a1 in the ﬁrst choice task is larger than in the second choice task (p = 0.03,
one-sided test on the equality of matched pairs of observations).
Figure 1: Choice combinations made in Treatment 1
RESULT 4: 28% of participants submit two diﬀerent choices in the two tasks of Treatment 1.
The majority of these participants choose the option in the ﬁrst choice task that is also chosen
most frequently in the single-choice task of Treatment 2, i.e., the option that is more preferred by
participants.
As indicated in Section 4.1.1., a random perturbation of utilities would predict a diﬀerent
pattern of choices. Under this assumption, choices in the second task of Treatment 1 would be
equally distributed as choices in Treatment 2, which is not observed. The presence of the ﬁrst choice
task signiﬁcantly aﬀects the choice probability in the second choice task. Note that this ﬁnding is
a menu eﬀect, reminiscent of prior evidence on the inﬂuence of irrelevant options in the choice set
(Tversky and Simonson 1993, Sonsino 2010). The ﬁrst task in Treatment 1 breaks the equivalence
of the two treatments' choice sets (despite the fact that standard theory prescribes all the choices
to coincide). In other words, the experiment relies on a menu eﬀect to demonstrate a preference
for randomization. The next experiment examines whether a preference for randomization also
appears in a framing experiment where the set of available options is held constant.
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4.2 Experiment II: Choice reversals and explicit preference for random-
ness
4.2.1 Design
Experiment II is conducted with 166 participants who have the choice between two prizes, where
prize a1 is a 19 Euro Amazon voucher and prize a2 is a 19 Euro Starbucks voucher. We conduct
two treatments varying the choice format. In the binary-choice format of Treatment 3, just as in
Treatment 1 of Experiment I, the 74 participants choose twice between the two prizes. Only one
choice task counts, as the participants receive the prize that they pick in the ﬁrst choice task with
probability 0.6 and the prize that they pick in the second choice task with the remaining probability
of 0.4. Treatment 4 is economically equivalent to Treatment 3 but it has a four-way-choice format
where 94 participants face the explicit choice between the following four options:
Option 1: You receive a1 with probability 0.6 and a2 with probability 0.4.
Option 2: You receive a1 with probability 1.
Option 3: You receive a2 with probability 0.6 and a1 with probability 0.4.
Option 4: You receive a2 with probability 1.
Like in Experiment I, the two treatments of Experiment II were conducted in the same class-
room, and one out of ten participants is paid for real.
4.2.2 Results
As is shown in Figure 2, 28% of the participants randomize in Treatment 3 by choosing both a1
and a2 exactly once in the two tasks. This compares to 53% of the participants in Treatment
4 who choose the explicit option to randomize between the two diﬀerent alternative prizes, i.e.,
Option 1 or Option 3. In the four-way-choice treatment the share of randomizing individuals is
thus signiﬁcantly larger compared to the binary-choice treatment (p < 0.01, one-sided Fisher's
exact test). The more salient randomization opportunity in Treatment 4 evokes the participants'
preference for randomization more strongly than the two-way choice frame of Treatment 3.
RESULT 5: When given the explicit opportunity to choose a lottery between two alternatives,
53% of the participants choose it. Lotteries with diﬀerent outcomes are chosen signiﬁcantly more
often than the corresponding indirect randomization in an economically equivalent repeated-choice
format.
As in Experiment I, random utility perturbations cannot explain the data of Experiment II.
Instead, we observe a pure framing eﬀect.
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Figure 2: Choices made in Treatments 3 and 4
4.3 Experiment III: Reversals between longer preference lists
In Experiments I and II, there are only two prizes among which participants can choose. This
diﬀers from many real-life settings such as university choice where decision makers rank more
than two alternatives. Experiment III examines whether reversals in the rank order can also be
found in choices between longer lists. To control for beliefs about the uncertain environment, we
again employ a simple experiment with vouchers as prizes. In addition, Experiment III involves
an unannounced second part.
4.3.1 Design
There are four available prizes, a1 to a4, consisting of one or two gift vouchers:
a1: 19 Euro Starbucks voucher
a2: 19 Euro Amazon voucher
a3: 14 Euro Starbucks & 10 Euro Amazon vouchers
a4: 8 Euro Starbucks & 16 Euro Amazon vouchers.
The four options are chosen in order to make the decision problem non-trivial. Since we expect
subjects to have a preference for either Amazon or Starbucks vouchers and because there may
be transaction costs associated with every voucher, the combination of two diﬀerent vouchers
is more valuable in monetary terms than a single voucher. Participants are asked to rank the
prizes on two lists, list (i) and list (ii), where each list is chosen to be payoﬀ-relevant with a
probability of 0.5. Each list, if chosen to be payoﬀ-relevant, delivers the diﬀerently ranked prizes
with given probabilities, detailed given below. This yields an incentive-compatible mechanism to
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report the full preference ranking: on both lists, the prize ranked ﬁrst is received with the highest
probability, the prize ranked second with the second highest probability, etc. As shown in Table
6, the distribution of probabilities among the diﬀerent ranks slightly diﬀers across the two lists.
Table 6: Probabilistic consequences of the two preference lists
Probability of getting prize ranked List (i) List (ii)
1st .5 .4
2nd .3 .3
3rd .2 .2
4th 0 .1
An expected-utility maximizer with strict preferences over the available prizes a1 to a4 would
list her most preferred prize ﬁrst on both lists, the second preferred prize second etc. Any other
combination of lists puts avoidable probability mass on receiving a less desirable outcome. Partic-
ipants with a preference for randomization, in contrast, may decide to submit diﬀerent lists.
We add to the experiment a (surprise) second part that appears immediately after the partici-
pants submit their preferred lists. In the second part, participants simply pick their most preferred
prize (a1, a2, a3 or a4). The choice in the second part does not allow for randomization and we thus
interpret it as the most preferred prize in the absence of the possibility of inducing randomness.
We hypothesize that among the subset of participants who top-ranked two diﬀerent prizes on list
(i) and list (ii), a majority reports a choice in the second part that conﬁrms the top rank of list
(i), not list (ii). This would be consistent with the desire to receive, from the ﬁrst choice task, the
most preferred prize with the highest available probability of 0.5.
The payoﬀs are implemented such that 10 percent of participants receive a prize in the ﬁrst
part of the experiment and a diﬀerent set of 10 percent of participants receive a prize in the second
part.
4.3.2 Results
A total of 314 students participated. Of these participants, 126 (40%) stated diﬀerent preferences
on list (i) and list (ii). Almost all reversals (92%) involve adjacent ranks, indicating the systematic
nature of the reversals: in most cases, a participant's list (ii) choice simply switches the ranking
of two prizes that are next to each other on the same participant's list (i). Furthermore, 99 out
of the 126 reversals (79%) occurred at the ﬁrst rank of the lists. We also observe that of these 99
occurrences, 56 participants conﬁrm list (i) in the experiment's second part, 30 conﬁrmed list (ii),
and 13 participants conﬁrmed neither list (i) nor list (ii). The diﬀerence in conﬁrmations of list
(i) and list (ii) is signiﬁcant (p < 0.01, one-sided Binomial test with N=86).25 This asymmetry is
25Note that alternatives here are trichotomic: conﬁrm list (i), conﬁrm list (ii), conﬁrm none of the two lists.
However, a Binomial test (on conﬁrming list (i) versus conﬁrming list (ii)) can still be used if the third group (that
does not conﬁrm any list) is made up 50-50 by the two former groups in expectation. In that case, the number of
observations relevant for the test equals the total number of reversals less the number of participants not conﬁrming
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inconsistent with unsystematic utility perturbations. We acknowledge that appropriately general
utility perturbances (similar to the literature on Generalized Expected Utility, e.g. Hey and Orme,
1994) are likely able to accommodate the data patterns. We do not model utility perturbances
here but merely note that for consistency with the data, their distributions would have to be
asymmetric across ranks in Experiment III (so they can justify that most reversals appear at the
top rank) and across tasks in Experiments I and II.
RESULT 6: In total, 40% of participants in Experiment III submit diﬀerent rank-order lists.
Participants who show reversals at rank 1 between their two lists show a systematic tendency to
conﬁrm their ﬁrst choice of list (i) in the second part of the experiment.
5 Conclusion
The paper documents a revealed preference for randomization in applications to university. In a
large data set on university applications in Germany, a pervasive pattern of reversals of preferences
between rank-order lists appears and induces randomness that could be avoided by the decision
maker. Signiﬁcant economic consequences arise from these preference reversals. Moreover, a survey
among university applicants indicates that the randomization is intentional. These ﬁndings relate
to a recent literature in behavioral mechanism design that studies the consequences of non-standard
behavior for market design. A common theme is that preferences over schools and universities are
often incomplete and malleable at the outset and are only formed over time, requiring the collection
and processing of information by applicants.
We conducted experiments to study the relevant features of the choice environment in a more
controlled setting. Across several experiments we observe that a signiﬁcant fraction of participants
choose to randomize between options. Many of the observed choices to randomize appear to be
deliberate, since they are taken in a row and follow patterns that are inconsistent with randomness
in their (otherwise standard) utility from outcomes, with bounded rationality, and generally with
most standard models of choice under uncertainty (but see the literature on stochastic choice cited
in Section 2). The observed desire for randomization is robust to variations of the framing: it
appears not only when the experimental participants have to make several choices and only one of
them becomes relevant with a certain probability, but also when there is the possibility to choose
a lottery directly.
We have identiﬁed a preference for randomization in a data set from the ﬁeld, namely university
applications. This complements the experimental evidence in Agranov and Ortoleva (2017). We
take from the survey among university applicants that indecision or perceived indiﬀerence is the
main driving forcedespite the fact that the stakes are extremely high in university choice. The
any list. Since there is no reason to assume that the third group is selective, this is how we proceed. We therefore
have N=99-13=86.
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survey is useful to pin down the applicants' motivations when applying to universities, not nec-
essarily the motivations of participants in the experiments. Nevertheless, the experiments add to
the picture by providing evidence that preference reversals and their implied violations of standard
choice theory are robust, and that diﬀerent preference lists are chosen deliberately even in very
simple controlled settings.
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A Appendix
A1 The Boston algorithm used in procedure A
The Boston algorithm applied in procedure A can be described as follows:
Step 1 : Only the ﬁrst preferences of the applicants are considered. For each university, admit
the selected applicants who have ranked it as their ﬁrst choice, until there are no seats left or until
all candidates ranking this university as their ﬁrst choice have been admitted. If there are more
candidates giving priority to a university than can be admitted, those applicants with the best
grades in the Abitur are admitted. Social criteria and (subordinately) lotteries are used to break
ties.
Step k : Only the k th preference of the still unassigned applicants is considered. For each
university with available seats, admit the selected applicants who have ranked it as their k th
choice, until there are no seats left or until all candidates ranking the university as their k th choice
have been admitted. If there are more candidates giving the rank k to a university than can be
admitted, those applicants with the best average ﬁnal grade from school are admitted. Social
criteria and (subordinately) lotteries are used to break ties.
The algorithm stops after step k ≤ 6 when every selected applicant is assigned or when all 6
preferences have been considered.
A2 The Gale-Shapley algorithm used in procedure U
The Gale-Shapley algorithm applied in procedure U works as follows:
Step 1 : Each university i with capacity n i oﬀers a seat to the n i applicants it ranks highest.
Each applicant tentatively accepts the oﬀer from the university she ranks highest and rejects all
remaining oﬀers.
Step k : Each university that was rejected at step k-1 by x applicants proposes to its most
preferred next choices, with the number of new oﬀers (x ) being equal to the number of rejections
in the previous round. Each applicant considers the university it has been holding an oﬀer from
together with her new oﬀers and tentatively accepts the university she ranks highest and rejects
all others.
The algorithm terminates when no proposal by a university is rejected. Each university and
applicant is assigned according to the last tentative assignment. If for a certain seat a university
is rejected by all applicants to which it has made an oﬀer and there is no applicant left on its
preference list, this seat remains unﬁlled.
A3 Newspaper experiment
Table 7 shows the prizes for the newspaper experiment in comparison to the classroom experiment,
Experiment III.
Regarding the payoﬀs for participants, the newspaper experiment has an ex-ante ﬁxed number
of 10 winners for the ﬁrst part and 10 diﬀerent winners for part II, to be drawn randomly. Since
readers of the WZB-Mitteilungen may be less likely to go to Starbucks than students, we replace
the Starbucks vouchers with cash payments. The monetary prize values in the newspaper experi-
ment are higher than in the classroom experiment in order to motivate the newspaper readers to
participate. To participate, they log on to a webpage and submit their preferences. In all other
respects the rules of the experiment are identical to those of Experiment III.
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Table 7: Prizes to be ranked in the experiments
Classroom - Experiment III Newspaper
a1 19 Euro Starbucks voucher 54 Euro Amazon voucher
a2 19 Euro Amazon voucher 42 Euro in cash
a3 14 Euro Starbucks & 10 Euro Amazon
vouchers
34 Euro Amazon voucher & 12 Euro in cash
a4 8 Euro Starbucks & 16 Euro Amazon vouch-
ers
14 Euro Amazon voucher & 30 Euro in cash
Overall, 194 participants submitted a complete set of online responses.26 Of these, 29 par-
ticipants (15%) do not submit identical lists. This percentage is lower than in the classroom
experiment, but the nature of reversals is similar. We observe that in 28 out of 29 reversals (97%)
only adjacent ranks were involved. Of the 29 reversals, 15 occurred at the ﬁrst rank (52%). We
also ﬁnd that choices in the experiment's second part tend to conﬁrm the ﬁrst choice on list (i).
In the second part, 10 participants conﬁrmed list (i) and only 3 conﬁrmed list (ii). This diﬀerence
is statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0.05, one-sided Binomial test with N = 13). Note also that 16
out of 29 participants presenting reversals do not conﬁrm either list in the second part, which is
inconsistent with the results from Experiment III but could again be due to a desire to randomize.
A4 Experiment I: Instructions and decisions sheets
A4.1 Instructions
Welcome!
In the following part of today's lecture you will participate in a decision experiment. We
will distribute decision sheets to you and we would like to ask you to please carefully read this
instruction sheet ﬁrst and then the decision sheet. With a bit of luck you can receive monetary
prizes, depending on your entries on the decision sheet. These prizes will be described further
below and they will be distributed at the end of this lecture.
Your entries will serve as data for current research projects by the TU Berlin, the HU Berlin, the
WZB (Social Science Research Center Berlin), the DIW (German Institute for Economic Research)
and the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance (Munich). Your data will remain
entirely anonymous.
It is crucial for the success of this experiment that you make your entries independently of each
other. From this moment on do not speak to the other participants until the end of the experiment
and do not look at their decision sheets. Also, please do not make any loud noises or create other
disruptions. If you do not abide by these instructions, we will exclude you from the possibility of
receiving a prize. Thank you.
If you have any questions, please alert the experiment conductor via a hand signal. We will
then approach you in order to answer your question silently.
Random determination of the winners
5 out of 100 experiment participants will be randomly selected and will receive their prizes ac-
cording to their decision sheets. To this purpose we will randomly select code numbers with a
26About half of the participants were directly aﬃliated with the WZB and thus either social scientists or familiar
with research in social sciences.
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computer subsequent to the experiment, that is, during the proceeding lecture. These draws will
determine who is entitled to receive a prize. Therefore, it is important that you keep the piece
of paper with the code number and that you write down your code number at the top of your
decision sheet. The computer will select a certain amount of numbers so as to exactly enable one
out of 20 participants in each of the (started) groups to receive their payout. For instance, with
300 participants 15 code numbers will be randomly chosen. With a number of participants in
between 301 and 320, 16 code numbers will be randomly chosen, etc.
Possible prizes
You can win the following vouchers  depending on your choices on the following page and the
rules given there. The vouchers can be used immediately and are valid for all products that can be
purchased at all Starbucks stores or at amazon.de respectively (with the exception of magazines
and download products).
Alternative A: Starbucks voucher over the amount of 19 EUR
Alternative B: Starbucks voucher over the amount of 14 EUR and Amazon voucher over the amount
of 10 EUR
A4.2 Decision Sheet, two lists with two-way choice (treatment 1)
Decision Sheet
We would now like to ask you to choose twice between the Alternatives A and B, in Option
(i) and Option (ii).
Only one of the two choices will be relevant for the determination of the prize, though Option (i)
will be more probable than Option (ii) with a ratio of 60/40. To this purpose we will later simulate
a random draw with the computer, which will result in a randomly chosen number between 1 and
100, where every integer in this interval occurs with the same probability. If the random draw
results in a number between 1 and 60, Option (i) is applied. Your payoﬀ, and the payoﬀs of all
other participants in the experiment, will only be determined by Option (i). Thus, this will occur
with a probability of 60%. If, however, the random draw results in a number between 61 and 100
(which will occur with a probability of 40%) only Option (ii) will be implemented.
Please state both your selection choices below.
Option (i): Which one of the Alternatives A/B would you prefer to receive?
Option (ii): Which one of the Alternatives A/B would you prefer to receive?
Please do not forget to write down your code number at the top. As soon as all participants
have ﬁlled in their choices, we will collect the decision sheets again and we will continue with
part two of the experiment. Until then, please remain calm and raise your hand if you have any
questions.
A4.3 Decision Sheet, one list with two-way choice (treatment 2)
We would now like to ask you to choose either alternative A or alternative B.
Your choice will only be considered with a probability of 40% and with the remaining probability
of 60% you will not receive a prize. To this purpose we will later simulate a random draw with the
computer, which will result in a randomly chosen number between 1 and 100, where every integer
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in this interval occurs with the same probability. If the random draw results in a number between
1 and 60, you will not receive a prize. If, however, the random draw results in a number between
61 and 100 (which will occur with a probability of 40%) you will receive either alternative A or B,
depending on your choice.
Please state your selection choice below.
Choice: Which one of the Alternatives A/B would you prefer to receive?
Please do not forget to write down your code number at the top. As soon as all participants
have ﬁlled in their choices, we will collect the decision sheets again and we will continue with
part two of the experiment. Until then, please remain calm and raise your hand if you have any
questions.
A5 Experiment II: Instructions and decisions sheets
A5.1 Instructions
Instructions
In the following part of today's lecture you will participate in a decision experiment for which we
have just distributed a decision sheet. We ask you to please carefully read this instruction sheet
ﬁrst and then the decision sheet. With a bit of luck you can receive monetary prizes, depending
on your entries on the decision sheet. These prizes will be described further below and they will
be distributed at the end of this lecture.
Your entries will serve as data for current research projects by the TU Berlin, the HU Berlin, the
WZB (Social Science Research Center Berlin), the DIW (German Institute for Economic Research)
and the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance (Munich). Your data will remain
entirely anonymous.
It is crucial for the success of this experiment that you make your entries independently of each
other. From this moment on do not speak to the other participants until the end of the experiment
and do not look at their decision sheets. Also, please do not make any loud noises or create other
disruptions. If you do not abide by these instructions, we will exclude you from the possibility of
receiving a prize. Thank you.
If you have any questions, please alert the experiment conductor via a hand signal. We will
then approach you in order to answer your question discreetly and quietly.
Random determination of the winners
Five out of 100 experiment participants will be randomly selected and will receive their prizes
according to their decision sheets. To this purpose we will randomly select code numbers with a
computer subsequent to the experiment, that is, during the proceeding lecture. These draws will
determine who is entitled to receive a prize. Therefore, it is important that you keep the piece of
paper with the code number and that you write down your code number at the top of your decision
sheet. The computer will select a certain amount of numbers so as to exactly enable one out of
20 participants in each of the (started) groups to receive their payout. For instance, with 300
participants 15 code numbers will be randomly chosen. With a number of participants between
301 and 320, 16 code numbers will be randomly chosen, and so forth.
Possible prizes
You can win the following vouchers  depending on your choices on the following page and the
rules given there. The vouchers can be used immediately and are valid for all products that can be
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purchased at all Starbucks stores or at amazon.de respectively (with the exception of magazines
and download products).
Alternative A: Starbucks voucher over the amount of 19 EUR
Alternative B: Amazon voucher over the amount of 19 EUR
A5.2 Decision sheet, binary-choice format (treatment 3)
We would now like to ask you to choose two times between the Alternatives A and B, in Option
(i) and Option (ii).
Only one of the two choices will be relevant for the determination of the prize, though Option
(i) will be more probable than Option (ii) with a ratio of 60/40. To this purpose we will later
simulate a random draw on the computer, which will result in a randomly chosen number between
1 and 100, where every integer in this interval occurs with the same probability. If the random
draw results in a number between 1 and 60, Option (i) is applied. Your payoﬀ, and the payoﬀs
of all other participants in the experiment, will only be determined by Option (i). Thus, this will
occur with a probability of 60%. If, however, the random draw results in a number between 61 and
100 (which will occur with a probability of 40%) only Option (ii) will be implemented. You can
decide whether to choose diﬀerent alternatives for both options or if you would prefer to choose
the same alternative twice.
Please state both your selection choices below.
Option (i): Which one of the Alternatives A/B would you prefer to receive?
Option (ii): Which one of the Alternatives A/B would you prefer to receive?
Please do not forget to write down your code number at the top. As soon as all participants
have ﬁlled in their choices, we will collect the decision sheets and we will determine the winners as
well as the prizes during the proceeding lecture. At the end of the lecture we will then announce
which code numbers won. Please remain silent. In case of questions questions, please raise your
hand.
A5.3 Decision sheet, four-way-choice format (treatment 4)
We would now like to ask you to choose from the following 4 possible options (Option 1 to Option
4), which in some cases result in a random selection of prizes.
Option 1:
You will receive Alternative A with a probability of 60% and Alternative B with a probability
of 40%.
Option 2:
You will receive Alternative A with a probability of 100%.
Option 3:
You will receive Alternative B with a probability of 60% and Alternative A with a probability
of 40%.
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Option 4:
You will receive Alternative B with a probability of 100%.
As you can see, the random draw which determines the prize for Options 1 and 3 follows two
probabilities with a ratio of respectively 60/40. To this purpose we will later simulate a random
draw with the computer, which will result in a randomly drawn number between 1 and 100, where
each integer in this interval occurs with the same probability. If the random draw results in a
number between 1 and 60, the primarily stated alternative will be implemented for you as well as
for all other experiment participants who have chosen Option 1 or Option 3. Thus, this will occur
with a probability of 60%. If, however, the random draw results in a number between 61 and 100
(which will occur with a probability of 40%) the alternative that was named in the second place
will be implemented. If you choose Option 2 or Option 4, which can only result in one alternative,
this random draw is irrelevant for you.
Please state your choice here:
Which one of the four Options would you like to choose?
Please do not forget to write down your code number at the top. As soon as all participants
have ﬁlled in their choices, we will collect the decision sheets and we will determine the winners as
well as the prizes during the proceeding lecture. At the end of the lecture we will then announce
which code numbers won. Please remain silent. In case of questions questions, please raise your
hand.
A6 Experiment III: Instructions and decisions sheets
A6.1 Instructions
Welcome!
In the following part of today's lecture you will participate in a decision experiment. We will
distribute decision sheets to you in a moment and we would like to ask you to please carefully
read this instruction sheet ﬁrst and then the decision sheet. With a bit of luck you can receive
monetary prizes, depending on your entries on the decision sheet. These prizes will be described
further below and they will be distributed at the end of this lecture.
Your entries will serve as data for current research projects by the TU Berlin, the HU Berlin, the
WZB (Social Science Research Center Berlin), the DIW (German Institute for Economic Research)
and the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance (Munich). Your data will remain
entirely anonymous.
It is crucial for the success of this experiment that you make your entries independently of each
other. From this moment on do not speak to the other participants until the end of the experiment
and do not look at their decision sheets. Also, please do not make any loud noises or create other
disruptions. If you do not abide by these instructions, we will exclude you from the possibility of
receiving a prize. Thank you.
If you have any questions, please alert the experiment conductor via a hand signal. We will
then approach you in order to answer your question silently.
Random determination of winners
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The experiment consists of two parts. In the ﬁrst part, 5 out of 100 experiment participants
will be randomly selected and will receive their prizes according to their decision sheets. To this
purpose we will randomly select code numbers with a computer subsequent to the experiment,
that is, during the proceeding lecture. These draws will determine who is entitled to receive a
prize. Therefore, it is important that you keep the piece of paper with the code number and that
you write down your code number at the top of your decision sheet. The computer will select
a certain amount of numbers so as to exactly enable one out of 20 participants in each of the
(started) groups to receive their payout. For instance, with 300 participants 15 code numbers will
be randomly chosen. With a number of participants in between 301 and 320, 16 code numbers will
be randomly chosen, etc.
Possible prizes
You can win the following vouchers or combination of vouchers  depending on your choices on
the following page and the rules given there. The vouchers can be used immediately and are valid
for all products that can be purchased at all Starbucks stores or at amazon.de respectively.
Alternative A: Starbucks voucher over the amount of 19 EUR
Alternative B: Amazon voucher over the amount of 19 EUR
Alternative C: Starbucks voucher over the amount of 14 EUR and Amazon voucher over the amount
of 10 EUR
Alternative D: Starbucks voucher over the amount of 8 EUR and Amazon voucher over the amount
of 16 EUR
A6.2 Decision sheet, part 1
Part 1 of the decision experiment
In this part of the experiment, we would like you to rank alternatives A to D twice, once in
ranking (i) and once in ranking (ii). According to these orders, you will receive the alternatives
with higher or lower probabilities
Only one of the two choices will be relevant for the determination of the prize. To this purpose
we will later simulate a coin ﬂip with the computer, which will result in either `heads' or `tails',
both equally likely. If the coin ﬂip results in `heads', ranking (i) is applied. Your payoﬀ, and
the payoﬀs of all other participants in the experiment, will only be determined by ranking (i). If,
however, the coin ﬂip results in `tails' only ranking (ii) will be implemented.
We will ask you with regard to both rankings, which of the alternatives you prefer over others.
It is also possible to only state three or less of the four alternatives per ranking, if you do not want
to receive the other alternatives. However, this does not increase the probability of winning the
remaining alternatives.
Ranking (i): From this ranking, you will receive the ﬁrst-listed alternative with a probability
of 50%, the second-listed alternative with a probability of 30%, the third-listed alternative with a
probability of 20% and the forth-listed alternative with 0% probability. Therefore, you will only
receive one of the alternatives, and the higher an alternative is listed, the higher is your chance of
receiving it. However, which of the alternatives from ranking (i) you will receive is determined by
a random draw with the computer after the lecture. The above stated underlying distribution of
probabilities is thereby respected.
Please state your ranking (i) below. But ﬁrst, please read the explanation of ranking (ii).
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Ranking (ii): From this ranking, you will receive the ﬁrst-listed alternative with a probability
of 40%, the second-listed alternative with a probability of 30%, the third-listed alternative with a
probability of 20% and the forth-listed alternative with 10% probability. Similarly to ranking (i),
the higher an alternative is listed, the higher is your chance of receiving it.
As explained above, only one of the two rankings will be applied, ranking (i) or ranking (ii).
Please state your rankings below.
Ranking (i): 50% for alternative , 30% for alternative , 20% for alternative , 0% for
alternative
Ranking (ii): 40% for alternative , 30% for alternative , 20% for alternative , 10%
for alternative
Please do not forget to insert your code number at the top of the page. As soon as all par-
ticipants will be ﬁnished with their decisions, we will collect all decision sheets and continue with
part two of the experiment. Until then, please remain silent and raise your hand if any questions
arise.
A6.3 Decision sheet, part 2
Part 2 of the decision experiment
In the second and last part of the experiment, we would like you to directly choose one of the
alternatives A to D. Again, the computer will select code numbers so as to ensure that exactly
one out of 20 participants in each of the groups receives his or her payout. For each group of 20
participants we will draw an additional code number.
Please note that your code number cannot be chosen in both parts of the experiment. Hence,
you will either receive a prize from part one of the experiment, or from part two of the experiment,
or no prize. If you are selected as a winner in part two of the experiment, your prize will be your
chosen alternative.
Which of the alternatives A to D do you want to receive?
Please remain silent and wait until we collected all decision sheets.
Thank you for your participation!
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A7 Survey among university applicants
[The survey was conducted on the website of the German clearinghouse for university admissions
in medicine, veterinary medicine, dental medicine, and pharmacy in the winter term 2015/2016.]
Thank you very much for taking part in this survey!
The answers provided in this survey serve to statistically evaluate the behavior of applicants
in general. They have no inﬂuence on how seats are allocated.
The survey takes about two minutes to complete. In order to thank you for your participation,
all participants will enter a lottery for an iPad.
1. Is this the ﬁrst time you are applying to study medicine, veterinary medicine, dental medicine,
or pharmacy in Germany?
Yes No
2. In the application process, it is possible to choose universities in diﬀerent locations. Appli-
cants can submit diﬀerent rank-order lists for (a) the quota for students with the best grades
from high school, (b) the quota for students with long waiting times, and (c) the quota where
universities select students. I have made use of this option in my application: Yes No,
I have submitted identical lists in all three procedures.
Questions which only appear if the answer was yes:
Do the following statements apply to you? (multiple answers are possible) I have speciﬁed
diﬀerent universities I have speciﬁed identical universities but in diﬀerent orders
3. I knew about the possibility to submit diﬀerent lists before I started my application Yes
No
Questions 4. + 5. only for those who answered yes in question 2:
4. The fact that I have speciﬁed diﬀerent location preferences, just happened was a
conscious decision
5. I have submitted diﬀerent rank-order lists in the procedure for the following reasons (up to
three answers):
Diﬀerent universities are equally suitable to me.
I ﬁnd it diﬃcult to decide what is the best university for me and have therefore chosen
diﬀerent universities.
I have no realistic chance to be admitted through the top-grade or waiting-time quota,
and have therefore chosen made random choices on these lists.
I would rather not take the decision myself, because I might regret my decision later on.
My university preference diﬀers from the university of choice of my family/friends. Spec-
ifying diﬀerent lists allows me to give a fair chance to satisfy both my families'/friends' and
my own wishes.
By specifying the university preferences I have tried to maximize my chances to receive
a seat at all.
I have speciﬁed diﬀerent lists in order to get a seat at my preferred university.
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Other reasons
I have submitted diﬀerent rank-order lists of universities for the following main reason:
Diﬀerent universities are equally suitable to me.
I ﬁnd it diﬃcult to decide what is the best university for me and have therefore chosen
diﬀerent universities.
I have no realistic chance to be admitted through the top-grade or waiting-time quota,
and have therefore chosen made random choices on these lists.
I`d rather not take the decision myself, because I might regret my decision later on.
My university preference diﬀers from the university of choice of my family/friends. Sub-
mitting diﬀerent lists allows me to give a fair chance to satisfy both the wishes of my families
and friends and my own wishes.
When submitting the rank-order lists, I have tried to maximize my chances to receive a
seat at all.
I have submitted diﬀerent lists in order to get a seat at my preferred university.
Other reasons
From here on the questions are again posed to all applicants:
6. Now we would like to present to you the decision for the universities in a simpler, hypo-
thetical decision scenario. Please think of your current favorite university and let's call it
university A. Think of your current second favorite university and let's call it university B.
Which of the following options would you prefer?
I am admitted to university A with certainty.
I am admitted to university A with a probability of 60% and to university B with a
probability of 40%.
I am admitted to university B with certainty.
I am admitted to university A with a probability of 40% and to university B with a
probability of 60%.
7. I rather leave some decisions to chance.
Yes
No
8. The following statements represent diﬀerent attitudes towards life and the future in general.
Please tell us to what an extent you agree on a scale from 1 to 7. Your answers will be
treated anonymously.
The course of my life depends on my own actions.
What one achieves in life is ﬁrst and foremost a question of destiny and luck.
I frequently experience that others decide over my life.
Success is the result of hard work.
If I encounter diﬃculties in life, I frequently have doubts about my own abilities.
My chances in life are determined by the social circumstances.
More important than eﬀort are one's capabilities.
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I have little control over the things happening in my life.
Thank you for participating in this survey!
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